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I. The experiential basis of immunity 
 
1.1 Error through misidentification : general and singular 
 
There is error through misidentification in the following type of situation. A subject S judges 
that some object a is F, because S has grounds for believing that some object is F and wrongly 
believes that a is one such object — i.e., an object x such that S has grounds for believing that 
x is F. This covers two types of case, depending on the nature of the subject’s grounds for 
holding that some object is F. 
In the standard type of case, the subject has singular grounds for believing that some 
object is F : there actually is an object x such that S has grounds for believing that x is F. 
 
ETM-S: 
There is an object x such that S has grounds for believing that x is F, but S mistakenly 
identifies some other object y as satisfying (z) (S has grounds for believing that z is F). 
 
For example, you see someone running and form the belief ‘He is in a hurry’. Wrongly 
believing that the person you see (and have grounds for taking to be in a hurry) is Tom, you 
form the judgment : ‘Tom is in a hurry’. Here there is an object x (namely the man you see 
running) such that you have grounds for believing that x is in a hurry, but you mistakenly 
identify some other object y, namely Tom, as the object satisfying (z) (S has grounds for 
believing that z is in a hurry). 
In the other type of case, the subject has grounds for believing that some object or 
other is F, but there is no object in particular such that the subject has grounds for believing 
that that object is F. The subject only has general grounds for holding that something is F. 
General though they are, such grounds may, in conjunction with other beliefs, themselves 
provide singular grounds, if they are taken to apply to some particular object. For example, I 
know that someone will win the lottery, and I know that the winner will go to Tahiti ; so I 
have (general) grounds for believing that someone will go to Tahiti. This provides me with 
singular grounds for holding that you will go to Tahiti, if I happen to believe that you will be 
the winner. (There is no inconsistency in saying both that the subject only has general 
grounds, AND that these grounds in turn provide singular grounds ; for the general grounds 
determine singular grounds only in conjunction with other beliefs. If we abstract from the 
collateral beliefs, the subject only has general grounds for holding that something is F ; if we 
factor them in, the subject turns out to have singular grounds as well — provided he is right in 
believing his general grounds apply to a particular object.) 
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This opens the way to the second type of error through misidentification : the subject 
may misidentify some object a as being such that, given the subject’s general grounds for 
holding that some object is F, these grounds apply to a, i.e. provide grounds for holding that it 
is F. 
 
ETM-G : 
S has grounds for believing that some object or other is F, and mistakenly believes that these 
grounds apply to a, i.e. provide grounds for holding that a is F. 
 
Again, I know that someone will win the lottery, and I know that the winner will go to Tahiti ; 
so I have grounds for believing that someone will go to Tahiti. If I mistakenly believe that you 
are going to win the lottery, I will infer that you will go to Tahiti. That judgment suffers from 
ETM-G since my general grounds for believing that someone will go to Tahiti do not in fact 
apply to you (since you do not fulfil the critical condition : being the winner, contrary to what 
I assume). 
The distinction between ETM-S and ETM-G resembles Pryor’s distinction between 
‘de re misidentification’ and ‘which-object misidentification’ (Pryor 1998), but it differs from 
it, as shown by the fact that Pryor’s paradigmatic example of which-object misidentification is 
not an instance of ETM-G. In Pryor’s example, the subject S smells a skunky odor in the 
garden and thinks ‘There is a skunk in my garden’. Then he sees a small animal a in his 
garden and wrongly applies to it the property (x) (x is a skunk in S’s garden), i.e. the 
property he has grounds for taking to be instantiated. S makes a mistake, because a is a 
distinct animal from b, the skunk whose characteristic odor S initially perceived. Here I would 
deny that S has only general grounds for holding that something is a skunk in S’s garden. S 
actually has singular grounds : there is an object, namely b, such that S has grounds for 
holding that it is a skunk in his garden, and S’s mistake is an instance of singular ETM-S : he 
wrongly identifies a as the object satisfying (z) (S has grounds for believing that z is F). 
Pryor says that in this type of case there is which-object misidentification, rather than 
de re misidentification, because the subject’s mistake does not consist in moving from an 
initial, correct singular judgment ‘b is F’ to an incorrect singular judgment ‘a is F’ via a 
mistaken identity ‘a = b’, but rather from an initial, correct general judgment ‘Some x is F’ 
(‘There is a skunk in my garden’) to the incorrect ‘a is F’ (‘That animal is a skunk in my 
garden’) via the mistaken application to a of the predicate which the subject correctly judges 
to be instantiated. But however general the judgment the subject initially makes in this case, 
his grounds for making the judgement are undoubtedly singular : there is an x (namely the 
skunk b whose odour the subject smells) such that S has grounds for holding that x is a skunk 
in S’s garden. These grounds are eo ipso grounds for making the general judgment that some 
object x is a skunk in S’s garden, and it is that general judgment which the subject articulates 
in Pryor’s example. What matters to my classification, however, is not the nature of the initial 
judgment the subject actually makes but the nature of the grounds for making it ; and in this 
case the grounds are undoubtedly singular. 
I will return to Pryor’s example in the third part of this chapter. For the time being I 
assume the distinction between ETN-S and ETN-G, Pryor’s example being a special case of 
ETN-S (along with standard cases of ‘de re misidentification’). In what follows, I focus on 
ETN-S and leave ETN-G aside. 
 
1.2  (Immunity to) error through misidentification : primitive and derivative 
 
Let us look more closely at the running man example. Several judgments are involved. The 
initial judgment is the perceptual judgement that b (the man one sees, thought of 
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demonstratively as ‘that man’) is running. The final judgment is the judgment that Tom is in a 
hurry. In between, we find the identity : ‘That man = Tom’. But the identity in question can 
intervene either after the perceptual judgment that b is running, yielding the (mistaken) 
judgement that Tom is running and the subsequent judgment that Tom is in a hurry (pattern 
A), or after the inferential judgment that b is in a hurry, itself based upon the initial judgment 
that b is running (pattern B). 
 
  Pattern A   Pattern B 
  That man is running  That man is running 
  Than man = Tom  That man is in a hurry 
  Tom is running  That man = Tom 
  Tom is in a hurry  Tom is in a hurry 
 
In both Pattern A and Pattern B, the final judgment that Tom is in a hurry suffers from error 
through misidentification. But in Pattern A the judgment that Tom is in a hurry inherits the 
misidentification error from the judgment that Tom is running, which already suffers from 
such an error. In Pattern B, the judgment that Tom is in a hurry suffers from misidentification 
in a non-derivative manner, just as the judgement that Tom is running does in Pattern A. I 
have used bold type to highlight the judgments that are subject to misidentification errors in a 
primary (non derivative) manner and directly rest upon an identity. 
A singular judgment ‘a is F’ that is subject to (non-derivative) error through 
misidentification (e.g. ‘Tom is running’ in A or ‘Tom is in a hurry’ in B) is such that its 
immediate grounds involve several premisses, one of which is the identity ‘a = b’. The 
possible falsity of the identity entails the possibility of errors through misidentification. By 
‘immunity to error through misidentification’ (IEM), I mean a singular judgment’s immunity 
to such errors. So, a singular judgement ‘a is F’ has the property of IEM just in case its 
immediate grounds do not involve an identity ‘a = b’. In both Pattern A and Pattern B above, 
the judgment ‘That man is running’ is IEM. In B, the judgment ‘That man is in a hurry’ is 
IEM too. This shows that, to be IEM, a judgment need not be directly based upon an 
experience. In A, the IEM judgment ‘That man is running’ is directly based upon a perceptual 
experience, but the judgment ‘That man is in a hurry’ in B is not (it is inferential), yet it is 
IEM, insofar as it does not rest upon an identity. 
Still, I want to tie immunity to error through misidentification to the property a 
singular judgment has whenever it is directly based upon an experience. We have just seen 
that an inferential judgment such as ‘That man is in a hurry’ can be IEM, but this should be 
qualified. That judgment is IEM only in a derivative sense, for it is based upon another 
judgment that is IEM too : the perceptual judgment ‘That man is running’. Not only is the 
judgment ‘That man is in a hurry’ inferred from the perceptual judgment ‘That man is 
running’ ; the former inherits its intentional object from the latter. There is (as some people 
put it) ‘de jure coreference’ between the subject of the former and the subject of the latter.1 
That means that the intentional object of the inferential judgment ‘That man is in a hurry’ is 
determined through the earlier, perceptual judgment ‘That man is running’ : the subject keeps 
thinking about the same man (the man seen running) and infers that he is in a hurry. Now I 
take it that an IEM judgment which inherits its intentional object from another IEM judgment 
in this manner only has derivative immunity ; the reason being that immunity has 
fundamentally to do with how one’s intentional object is determined. So a judgment displays 
primitive, rather than derivative, IEM just in case (i) it is IEM, and (ii) it does not inherit its 
intentional object (the object it is about) from another IEM judgment in its grounds, as ‘That 
                                                 
1
 On this issue, see e.g. Campbell 1994, 2002 ; Fine 2007 ; Pinillos forthcoming. 
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man is in a hurry’ does in Pattern B. Singular judgments which are directly based upon an 
experience display primitive immunity in that sense, I will argue. 
Let us take stock. I have distinguished between derivative and non-derivative 
(primitive) forms of error through misidentification, and defined IEM in terms of the latter. 
An IEM judgment ‘a is F’ is such that its (immediate) grounds do not involve an identity ‘a = 
b’ whose possible falsity entails the possibility of misidentification errors. Now it turns out 
that immunity cases too have to be divided into primitive and derivative. Some judgments are 
IEM in a derivative manner : they inherit their intentional object (viz. a) from a judgment that 
is already IEM. Other judgments are IEM in a primitive, non derivative manner : their 
immediate grounds involve neither an identity ‘a = b’, nor another IEM judgment ‘a is G’ 
from which they inherit their intentional object. In both Pattern A and Pattern B, only ‘That 
man is running’ (the judgment that is directly based on the perceptual experience) displays 
primitive IEM. It is that notion of primitive IEM which I try to elucidate in the next section, 
by looking at the paradigmatic case : that of first-person judgments. I will return to the 
immunity of demonstrative judgments in the third part of this chapter. 
 
1.3  Immunity and the first-personal character of experience 
 
With first-person judgments we can replicate the three types of case we have introduced. 
Consider (1)-(2) below: 
 
(1a) That man’s legs are crossed [said or thought while looking at someone in the mirror] 
(1b) Oh, but that man is myself ! 
(1c) (So) my legs are crossed 
 
(2a) I have a headache 
(2b) (So) I will not be able to concentrate ; I should stop working 
 
The first-person judgment (1c) is made on the basis of the demonstrative judgment (1a) and 
the identity (1b) ; it is therefore subject to error through misidentification (the subject may be 
wrong in identifying himself with the person seen in the mirror). If (1c) was made directly on 
the basis of a proprioceptive experience (if the subject felt the position of his legs, ‘from 
inside’) it would be immune to error through misidentification (in a non-derivative manner) : 
the subject could not be mistaken specifically concerning the person whose legs are crossed. 
In such a situation, it would make no sense for the subject to wonder : ‘Someone’s legs are 
crossed, but is it me ?’ Likewise, judgement (2a) displays primitive immunity : it is directly 
based on the experience of headache, which it reports. In that situation the subject cannot 
wonder: ‘Someone has a headache, but is it me ?’ (2b) also is IEM2, but it is so only 
derivatively. It is based upon the prior judgment (2a) and inherits its intentional object from it. 
 There is primitive (non-derivative) IEM, I contend, whenever the first-person 
judgment is directly based upon an experience. Where does the immunity come from, in such 
a case ? It comes from the fact that experiences are intrinsically first-personal. Of course, 
experiences need not represent the subject of experience ; they need not be first-personal in 
that sense. Just as the content of our judgments, the content of one’s experiences may but 
need not be about the subject herself. The feature that makes an experience (as opposed to a 
judgment) intrinsically first-personal is not its content, I claim, but its mode. 
                                                 
2
 It would make no sense for the subject to think : ‘Someone will not be able to concentrate, 
but is it me ?’ 
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What — following Searle (1983) — I call the ‘mode’ is what enables us to classify 
experiential states into types such as perceptions, memories, etc., quite independent of the 
content of the state (what is perceived, remembered, etc.). The mode M of an experience 
determines that (if all goes well) a certain relation RM holds between the subject of the 
experience (S) and what the experience represents (its content p). The subject undergoing an 
experience M(p) is therefore entitled to proceed as if he or she bore relation RM to p. For 
example, the subject undergoing a visual experience normally stands in an appropriate causal 
relation to the scene represented (she ‘sees’ the scene, i.e. stands in front of it and has her 
visual apparatus causally affected by it) ; in episodic memory, the subject’s relation to the 
scene represented is that of having perceived it in the past ; in proprioception the subject’s 
relation to the bodily condition represented by the state is that of being in that condition. On 
the view I argued for in Perspectival Thought, the content of a proprioceptive state is a 
property (a bodily condition) which the subject is entitled to self-ascribe, just as the subject is 
entitled to self-ascribe the property of standing-in-front-of-and-being-causally-affected-by 
what his or her visual experience represents, or the property of having-perceived-in-the-past 
the scenes represented by his or her episodic memories. If the subject makes these self-
ascriptions explicit, the resulting judgments are immune to error through misidentification ; 
for even if the subject is mistaken in holding that she bears RM to p, still she is not entitled to 
conclude that anybody but her bears that relation to the content of the experience. The subject 
cannot think, on the basis of her episodic memories : ‘Someone experienced these scenes in 
the past, but was it I ?’ Nor can she think, on the basis of her perceptual experience : 
‘Someone is currently seeing these things, but is it I ?’ Nor can she think, on the basis of her 
proprioceptive experience : ‘Someone’s legs are crossed, but are they mine ?’ 
To sum up : An experience, whether visual, mnesic, or proprioceptive, concerns the 
subject who undergoes the experience. That is so even though the subject is not represented in 
the content of the experience. I have just said that the content of a proprioceptive experience 
is nothing but a bodily condition. What makes the bodily condition in question the subject’s 
bodily condition is the mode of the experience : no information can be gained on the 
proprioceptive mode concerning the position of other people’s limbs. The fact that the limbs 
whose position is represented are the subject’s limbs, rather than those of some other person, 
is therefore guaranteed by the proprioceptive mode.  No such thing happens when the subject 
sees the position of her limbs in the mirror, as in (1) ; for the perceptual mode does not 
guarantee that the person whose limbs are seen is the subject. What it guarantees, however, is 
that the person who sees is the subject, i.e. the person undergoing the visual experience. 
 
 
II. Immunity and the explicit/implicit distinction 
 
2.1  Implicit de se thoughts 
 
When the subject feels that her legs are crossed, from inside, only the position of the legs are 
represented, I said. The subject is not represented but is involved implicitly through the 
proprioceptive mode, whose informational deliverances can only concern the subject. Self-
ascriptions of bodily properties based on proprioceptive experience are therefore immune to 
error through misidentification. In contrast, when the subject is represented in the content of 
her experience, as when she sees herself in the mirror, she is represented ‘as object’, from a 
third person point of view. The state is first-personal only derivatively, because the subject 
identifies the object represented as herself, the subject of experience. That gives rise to the 
possibility of errors, if the subject’s identification is mistaken. Still, in that situation, the 
subject is at the same time given ‘as subject’, through the experiential mode : she is the person 
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seeing the scene in the mirror, at the same time as she is the person seen. The subject is thus 
involved twice, as is apparent from the explicit judgment one can make on the basis of such a 
visual experience of oneself : ‘I see that my legs are crossed’. The initial occurrence of ‘I’ 
corresponds to a first-personal feature of the experience that is not reflected in its content 
(since the seeer is not part of what is seen). The second occurrence of the first person (‘my’) 
corresponds to an aspect of the content of the experience : the person whose legs are seen in 
the mirror to be crossed. Now the judgment is immune to error through misidentification with 
respect to the first occurrence of the first person, which is a use of ‘I’ ‘as subject’ ; but the 
same judgment is vulnerable to misidentification errors with respect to the second occurrence 
of the first person (‘my legs’) : for the subject may be wrong in identifying herself as the 
person whose legs are seen. This strongly suggests that there is immunity to error through 
misidentification to the extent that the subject of experience is not represented in the content 
of the experiential state, but is involved implicitly through the mode. 
In Perspectival Thought, on the basis of that observation, I distinguished between 
implicit and explicit de se thoughts, and I deemed immunity to error through misidentification 
a distinguishing property of implicit de se thoughts. Thoughts that are implicitly de se involve 
no reference to the self at the level of content : what makes them de se is simply the fact that 
the content of the thought is evaluated with respect to the thinking subject. The subject serves 
as ‘circumstance of evaluation’ for the judgement, rather than being a constituent of content. 
Or, to put it in slightly different terms, in such cases the content of the thought is not a 
complete proposition ascribing a certain property to an object (viz., the subject 
himself/herself) : the content is the property, but to think the thought — or to think it in the 
relevant mode — is, for the subject, to self-ascribe that property (Loar 1976 : 358 ; Lewis 
1979 ; Chisholm 1979, 1981). In such cases the subject is given only ‘as subject’. It is not 
given as an object that one has to identify as oneself, but it is directly given as oneself, the 
subject of experience. 
In the framework set up in Perspectival Thought a connection is drawn between three 
distinctions, corresponding to three basic questions : 
 
(i) The subject/object distinction. Question : Is the subject given ‘as object’, as when 
she sees herself in the mirror, or is the subject only given ‘as subject’ ? 
(ii) The implicit/explicit distinction. Question : Is the subject explicitly represented in 
the content of the thought, or is the content selfless, in which case the first-
personal character of the thought comes from outside its content ? 
(iii) The distinction between first-person judgments that are immune to error through 
misidentification and those that are not. Question : Could it be that the subject is 
justified in holding that something is F, but mistaken in ascribing the property to 
herself ? 
 
The first distinction is Wittgenstein’s, and it is, indeed, closely related to the third distinction, 
also introduced by Wittgenstein, between first person judgments that are immune to error 
through misidentification and first person judgments that are not (Wittgenstein 1958).
3
 To be 
immune to error through misidentification, a first person judgment must be truly subjective. 
The subject must not be thought of as an object which one identifies as oneself ; for if it is, the 
judgment rests on an identity (‘b = myself’) and is subject to identification errors. 
                                                 
3
 The terminology, of course, comes from Shoemaker (1968). 
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 The second distinction is an application of Perry’s famous contrast between 
‘concerning’ and ‘being about’ (Perry 1986 ; Recanati  2007).4 A judgment like ‘It is raining’ 
is said to concern the place where the subject is, even if that place is not explicitly 
represented. The content of the judgment is not a complete proposition, but (as Perry puts it) a 
‘propositional function’, true of a place ; when the judgment is made, it is applied to the place 
which the judgment concerns (the place of  utterance, typically). ‘It is raining here’ has a 
different content : this time, the place the subject is in is explicitly represented in the content 
of the thought, which is fully propositional. The truth-conditions of the two thoughts are the 
same : both are true iff it is raining at the place where the subject is. But the place only comes 
into the picture as (parameter of the) circumstance of evaluation in the first type of case, 
without being represented in the content that is evaluated with respect to the place in 
question ; while in the explicit case, the location is represented in the content. Note that, in 
this type of case, the situation of evaluation has to be ‘bigger’ than in the previous case ; for 
the only reason why one makes the location explicit by feeding it into the content is that a 
potential contrast is drawn between the place in question (where it is raining) and some other 
places (Recanati 1997 : 54-55). The situation of evaluation has to be big enough to include all 
the locations, between which a contrast is drawn (Recanati 2000 : 65-66). 
When no contrast is at issue, because only one place — the place we are in — is 
relevant and matters to our present purposes, it does not have to be represented explicitly in 
the content. The role of representational content is to keep track of whatever is susceptible to 
variation ; what is invariant and fixed does not have to be represented. This principle applies 
to the cases we have discussed. A good example is the proprioceptive case : proprioception 
can only give us information about ourselves, so there is no need to represent the subject 
whose bodily condition is proprioceptively represented, since there are no relevant 
alternatives. Just as the content of ‘It is raining’ is a location-neutral content, true at some 
places and false at others, the content of a proprioceptive state is a person-neutral content, true 
at some persons and false at others. When the judgment is made, the relativized content is 
applied to the place, or the person, which the judgment concerns, and this is determined by 
factors external to content (the mode, in the proprioceptive case). Immunity to error through 
misidentification precisely arises from the fact that the subject which the judgment concerns 
is determined by the experiential mode in an invariant manner. Given the nature of the state, it 
can only concern the subject ; there simply is no alternative, hence no possibility of error. 
Was I right, in Perspectival Thought, to equate subjectivity to content-selflessness, 
and to treat immunity as the hallmark of implicit de se thoughts ? Yes and no. I maintain what 
I said above, namely, that there is immunity to error through misidentification to the extent 
that the subject of experience is not represented in the content of the experiential state. So I 
maintain the gist of the theory, but would like to present a subtler and more exact picture of 
the relations between experience, first person judgment and immunity. The critical issue is 
this : is it possible for an explicit de se thought, that is, a thought in which the subject is 
explicitly represented, to be immune to error through misidentification ? The framework set 
up in Perspectival Thought seems to rule out this possibility, but it is important, indeed 
essential, to make room for it.
5
 In other words, I wish to deny that only implicit de se thoughts 
display primitive immunity to error through misidentification (contrary to what I suggested in 
Perspectival Thought). Explicit de se thoughts can also be IEM in a non-derivative manner. 
Still, I will maintain, the experience on which such a judgment is based has to fit the above 
description, i.e., its content has to be selfless. 
                                                 
4
 Note that my interpretation of the distinction (actually the standard interpretation) is not 
exactly the same as Perry’s original proposal. 
5
 I am indebted to Daniel Morgan for pressing this point on me. 
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2.2  The immunity of explicit de se thoughts 
 
Above I mentioned ‘the explicit judgment one can make on the basis of a visual experience of 
oneself’, and I said that such a judgment (‘I see that my legs are crossed’) is IEM with respect 
to the first occurrence of the first-person, though not with respect to the second. Does this not 
establish that explicit first-person judgments can be IEM ? It does, and it is easy to come up 
with examples of explicit de se thoughts displaying IEM. 
 First, I mentioned that we make something explicit when a contrast between that thing 
and various alternatives is relevant. Thus I say ‘It is raining here’ (rather than merely : ‘It is 
raining’) only if I intend to contrast the present location, where it is raining, with other 
locations where it is not. Now a first-person judgment based on proprioceptive evidence and 
therefore immune to error through misidentification can be explicit precisely because such a 
contrast is relevant : ‘My legs are crossed (in contrast to my neighbour’s)’. This can be said, 
not because one sees one’s legs in the mirror, but because one feels one’s legs and knows, on 
the basis of pure proprioceptive evidence, that they are crossed. Here no identification 
mistake can arise : being proprioceptive, my evidence can only concern myself. Still, I intend 
to contrast the position of my legs (known in this immune manner) with the position of other 
people’s legs ; and that contrast justifies making the subject explicit. It would be implausible 
to maintain that the content of such a (contrastive) judgment is ‘selfless’. Likewise, suppose I 
am asked : ‘How many people in this room are such that their legs are crossed ?’ I can 
respond ‘Peter, Jim, and me’, even though I have third person evidence based upon visual 
observation (subject to identification errors) in the case of Peter and Jim, and proprioceptive 
evidence (not subject to identification errors) in my own case. Who could deny that I 
explicitly refer to myself in the response, just as I explicitly refer to Peter and Jim ? 
 Or consider ‘mixed’ inferences involving first person thoughts with different IEM-
status, e.g. ‘I am standing, I was born in Paris, therefore someone who was born in Paris is 
standing’ (or ‘someone was born in Paris and is standing’). The first premiss is a first person 
judgment based on kinaesthetic evidence (hence immune to error through misidentification), 
but the second premiss is not IEM : ‘I was born in Paris’ is an ‘objective’ judgment about 
myself, based on evidence that is not experiential or intrinsically first-personal, and it is 
subject to misidentification errors. The inference seems to be an enthymeme with the  
following form : 
 
a is F 
a is G 
x (x is F & x is G) 
 
How shall we account for that inference if we do not treat the first judgment as having the 
‘categoric’ structure ‘a is F’, but as being subjectless (‘thetic’) and akin to ‘It is raining’ ?6  
Faced with such examples, we should give up the claim that only implicit de se 
thoughts are immune to error through misidentification, i.e., that the IEM character of a 
judgment is due to the selflessness of the content of that judgment. What needs to have 
selfless content is the experience on which a first-person judgment has to be based in order to 
display immunity ; but the content of the judgment may be more complex and may explicitly 
                                                 
6
 On the ‘thetic/categoric’ distinction, elaborated by Marty (after Brentano), see Kuroda 1972.  
Roughly, the content of a thetic judgment is ‘simple’ and corresponds to the content of a 
predicate, while the content of a categoric judgment is more complex since it contains 
something that corresponds to the subject of which something is predicated. 
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represent the subject of experience, without the judgment’s losing its immunity. Or so I will 
argue. 
Consider the kinaesthetic experience of a subject who knows, from inside, that he is 
standing. I maintain that the content of that experience just is the property of standing, which 
is detected on what, in Perspectival Thought, I called the ‘internal mode’. I also maintain that 
the experience outputs a judgment (the primary judgment, that which is immediately based on 
the experience and/or constitutive of it
7
) with the same thetic content, namely a property 
which the subject self-ascribes. That judgment is what I call an implicit de se thought, a type 
of first-person thought which is IEM because the subject’s involvement is secured through the 
mode of the grounding experience. Now whenever something is contributed by the mode 
rather than part of content, it is possible to make it explicit by entertaining a more complex 
thought the content of which involves that very component. The transition from the simple to 
the more complex thought I call ‘Reflection’ (Recanati 1997, 2000) : it is non-inferential and 
requires no new evidence on the part of the subject. Thus a subject who, on the basis of 
perception, forms the thought ‘It is raining’ is automatically entitled to judge ‘It is raining 
here’, without any extra evidence being required on his or her part. (The subject only needs to 
have the conceptual resources required to entertain a thought explicitly about his or her 
current location.) That is so because perception is bound to concern the place where the 
perceiver is. ‘It is raining here’ simply makes explicit something that is already implicit in the 
experience which grounds the simpler judgment ‘It is raining’. Similarly, if, on the basis of 
his proprioceptive experience, the subject forms the explicit first person judgment that his 
own legs are crossed (in contrast to his neighbour’s), the content of that judgment differs from 
the simpler, selfless content of the experience (and of the primary judgment that goes with it), 
but nothing in addition to the experience in question is required to ground the more complex 
judgment : it simply makes explicit what was already conveyed by the mode of the grounding 
experience.  
To sum up : Reflection is a transition which involves making explicit (in the content of 
the judgment) something that was not part of the content but was nevertheless implicitly 
contributed through the mode of the grounding experience. That element was already present 
in the semantics of the simple judgment through the situation of evaluation relevant to it 
(which situation is determined by the mode, according to Perspectival Thought). Thus the 
content of an implicit de se thought is ‘person-relative’ and is evaluated with respect to the 
thinking subject, just as the content of the perceptual judgment ‘It is raining’ is location-
relative and evaluated with respect to the place of perception. Equivalently we can say, with 
Lewis, that the content of an implicit de se thought is a property which the thinker self-
ascribes. Such a thought indeed involves a self-ascription, albeit an implicit one, and that self-
ascription is immune to identification errors since it is driven by the mode and does not allow 
for alternatives. Reflection preserves immunity because no extra premiss — and in particular 
no identity premiss — comes into play in the transition from the experience and the primary 
judgment to the more explicit judgment. So a judgment is immune to error through 
misidentification if it is implicitly de se, that is, if the subject is not represented in the content 
of the judgment but his or her involvement is secured by the mode of the grounding 
experience ; yet an explicit de se thought may also be IEM if it has the same grounds as an 
implicit de se thought. In the above example, the kinaesthetic experience justifies both the 
implicit de se thought and the more reflective de se thought in which the subject’s 
involvement is made explicit. 
                                                 
7
 It does not matter for my purposes whether one construes the judgment in question as 
constitutive of the experience or as immediately based on it, and I will leave that issue open. 
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Above I characterized primitive IEM negatively : a judgment displays primitive IEM 
just in case (i) the judgment is IEM (i.e. its grounds do not include an identity ‘a = b’) and (ii) 
it does not inherit its intentional object from another IEM judgment. By this definition, 
explicit de se thoughts based upon a first-person experience are IEM just like the primary 
judgment immediately based upon (or constitutive of) the experience. The only difference 
between the implicit de se thought and its explicit counterpart is that the latter proceeds 
through Reflection and requires, on the part of the thinker, the conceptual ability to self-refer, 
i.e. the possession of a concept of ‘self’. 
 
2.3  Reflection, immunity, and indexicality 
 
One might think that an additional premiss is needed to go from the simple judgment ‘It is 
raining’ to the explicit ‘It is raining here’, namely a premiss to the effect that the simple 
judgment (because it is based on perception) concerns the place where the thinker is. That, 
however, would be a mistake. No such premiss is actually needed because the fact that the 
simple judgment ‘It is raining’ concerns the place where the subject is is constitutive of that 
judgment, on the view under discussion. A judgment is individuated both in terms of its 
content and in terms of the situation it concerns ; this duality at the judgment level reflects the 
mode/content duality at the experiential level. So if the judgment concerned a different place 
(a place that had just been talked about, for example), it would be a different judgment, 
though one with the same content (in the narrow sense of ‘content’).8 
An additional premiss would be needed only if the place which the judgment concerns 
was identified in a ‘detached’ manner as, say, the city of Cajarc, rather than indexically as the 
place where the subject is. There is indeed a clear difference between the transition from ‘It is 
raining’ to ‘It is raining in Cajarc’ and the transition from ‘It is raining’ to ‘It is raining here’. 
The former depends upon an auxiliary premiss to the effect that Cajarc is the place where the 
subject is located. Because of that additional premiss, it may be that the judgment ‘It is 
raining’ is correct and justified (if e.g. the subject sees and feels rain) even though the explicit 
judgment ‘It is raining in Cajarc’ is not : that will be the case if the subject is wrong to assume 
that he is in Cajarc. But the subject cannot simultaneously be right in making the perceptual 
judgment that it is raining and wrong in making the more complex judgment ‘It is raining 
here’. 
To account for the difference between the two transitions — from ‘It is raining’ to ‘It 
is raining here’, and from ‘It is raining’ to ‘It is raining in Cajarc’ — I suggest that we 
consider the latter as more complex than the former, and as presupposing it. Reflection is 
what takes us from ‘It is raining’ to ‘It is raining here’. As I pointed out, that transition is 
automatically justified and requires no additional premiss. In the explicit judgment ‘It is 
raining here’, the place is identified indexically via the contextual relation the subject bears to 
it (the relation of being in that place). To get to ‘It is raining in Cajarc’, the place in question 
must be identified in a detached manner, independently of that relation. Such an identification 
requires a supplementary premiss such as ‘here = Cajarc’. The pattern is : 
 
(A) It is raining   (primary judgment) 
(B) It is raining here  (from A, by Reflection) 
(C) Here = Cajarc   (additional premiss) 
                                                 
8
 In the framework set up in Perspectival Thought, there are two levels of content, broadly 
understood. The content in the narrow sense (or lekton) is the (possibly relativized) content 
we evaluate at a circumstance, while the ‘Austinian proposition’ is constituted by the lekton 
together with the relevant situation of evaluation. 
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(D) It is raining in Cajarc  (from B and C, through substitution of identicals) 
 
Since (C) may be mistaken, (D) is subject to misidentification errors, while (B) is not. 
The same pattern applies in the first person case. When the subject knows, from 
inside, that he is standing, the content of his experiential state is the propertyof standing, 
which the subject implicitly self-ascribes (or evaluates with respect to himself) in virtue of the 
first-person quality of the experiential mode. Through Reflection the subject can make his 
own involvement explicit and represent himself as the bearer of the property : ‘I am standing’. 
That transition requires no additional premiss : nothing more than the original first-person 
experience is required to ground the explicit self-ascription, since a feature of that experience 
(the first person quality of the mode) justifies ascribing the detected property to the subject of 
experience. An additional premiss is required only if the subject identifies himself in a 
detached manner as, say, François Recanati. The same pattern recurs : 
 
(A’) Standing   (primary judgment, implicitly de se) 
(B’) I am standing   (from A’, by Reflection) 
(C’) I am François Recanati (additional premiss) 
(D’) F. Recanati is standing (from B’ and C’, through substitution of identicals) 
 
The final judgment, (D’), is vulnerable to misidentification errors, for it rests on a prior 
judgment of identity, (C’), which may be mistaken. (Perhaps I am not François Recanati, 
contrary to what I believe.) But the self-ascription (B’), explicit though it is, is immune to 
errors through misidentification because its justificational basis is identical to that of the 
primary judgment. The judgment resulting from Reflection is justified just in case the primary 
judgment is justified, so no new possibility of error is generated by the transition from the 
primary judgment to the explicit self-ascription, when the latter involves an indexical mode of 
presentation such as ‘I’ or ‘here’.9 
 Why does the output of Reflection have to involve indexical concepts such as those 
expressed by the words ‘here’, ‘I’ or ‘now’ ? Because such concepts are ways of thinking of 
objects through contextual relations the subject bears to them, and these relations to the 
objects of thought are implied by the experiential modes. In the explicit judgment ‘It is 
raining here’, the place is identified indexically via the contextual relation the subject bears to 
it : the relation of being in that place. Now the subject has to stand in that relation to a place in 
order to gain information perceptually from it (i.e. in order to know, through perception, what 
happens in that place). Similarly, in the explicit de  se thought ‘I am standing’, the object to 
which the property of standing is ascribed is identified indexically via the relation of identity 
to the thinking subject ;
10
 and the subject can gain information about an object on the 
                                                 
9
 Of course, an explicit self-ascription such as ‘I am standing’ or ‘My legs are crossed’ can be 
subject to misidentification errors if it is based not on the subject’s kinaesthetic experience, as 
in (2’), but on a visual experience, as in (1c) above (section 2.1). The explicit self-ascription 
now depends upon an identity premiss, viz. (1b), which may be false. 
10
 That does not mean that the subject has to be able to think about the relation of identity 
between himself and the object of thought. Indexical concepts are best construed as mental 
files based upon contextual relations to the referent (Recanati 2010). To think of an object 
through contextual relations to that object just is to think of it by means of such a mental file. 
What makes it the case that the file is based upon a certain contextual relation to the referent 
is the fact that  (i) it exists only as long as the contextual relation to the object endures, and 
(ii) the reference of the file is determined by the relation. But the contextual relation on which 
the file is based does not have to be represented by the owner of the file. 
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proprioceptive/kinaethetic mode only if he or she stands in that relation (identity) to that 
object. So, to cut a long story short, the reason why the outputs of Reflection have to involve 
indexical concepts is that indexical concepts are those concepts which exploit the contextual 
relations to the environment on which experience implicitly depends. 
 
 
III. The immunity of demonstrative judgments 
 
3.1 A putative problem for my account 
 
As we have seen, demonstrative judgements, like first-person judgments, can be immune to 
error through misidentification. The subject who sees a man running cannot reasonably 
wonder : ‘Someone is running, but is it that man’ ? Intuitively, the reason why the 
demonstrative judgment ‘That man is running’ is immune to error through misidentification is 
that the information that someone is running is acquired through looking at the man in 
question, in such a way that the (general) information that someone is running cannot be 
dissociated from the (singular) information that that man is running.
11
 If the singular 
information turns out to be illusory, one cannot retreat to the existential generalization 
‘Someone is running’ ; once exposed as illusory, the experience no longer provides one with 
any grounds for holding that someone is running – it seemed that someone was running, 
namely that man, but that turned out to be illusory ! As Evans used to put it, ‘there is no gap’ 
between the information that someone is running, and the information that that man is, and 
that is what gives rise to immunity  (Evans 1982 : 180, 182, 221). 
 It is unclear, however, that the immunity of demonstrative judgments can be handled 
in the way I have suggested for the first person case. According to my account, when a 
singular judgment ‘a is F’ is immune to error through misidentification, the object to which 
the property of being F is ascribed is not explicitly represented in the experience which 
grounds the ascription, but is determined by the experiential mode. Demonstrative judgments 
provide an apparent counter-example to that analysis, for they can be immune, yet there is 
hardly any doubt that the object to which the property is ascribed is represented in the content 
of the judgment. 
 Demonstrative judgments involve selectively attending to some object as opposed to 
others ; they rest on discrimination (Strawson 1959 : 18-19). As David Kaplan puts it, the use 
of a demonstrative must be accompanied by a ‘demonstration’, typically ‘a (visual) 
presentation of a local object discriminated by a pointing’ (Kaplan 1989 : 490). Qua mode of 
presentation of the reference of the demonstrative, the standard form of the demonstration, he 
says, is 
 
The individual that has appearance A from here now 
 
‘where an appearance is something like a picture with a little arrow pointing to the relevant 
subject’ (Kaplan 1989 : 526). These characterizations, which I take to be phenomenologically 
correct, suggest that demonstrative thought is essentially contrastive : something is 
discriminated from other things (the rest of the ‘picture’) through an act of selective attention, 
                                                 
11
 Campbell gives an example (the ‘transparent chair’ example) in which the property 
detected by looking at some object is not actually instantiated by that object but by another 
object (Campbell 1997 : 69-70). Space prevents me from discussing that alleged 
countexample to the claim that demonstrative judgments like ‘That man is running’ are IEM, 
and I will simply take it for granted that they are. 
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represented by the ‘pointing’ or the ‘little arrow’. Now this essentially contrastive character 
comports badly with the idea that the object to which the property is ascribed in a 
demonstrative judgment might remain implicit ; for something remains implicit only when 
there is no need to make it explicit, because no alternative is salient enough. As I said above 
(§2.2), ‘we make something explicit when a contrast between that thing and various 
alternatives is relevant.’ Now the idea of contrast seems to be built into the very notion of a 
demonstrative thought. If that is right, then the immunity of demonstrative judgments such as 
‘That man is running’ cannot be explained by appealing to the idea that the demonstrated 
object remains implicit. 
The same point can be pressed by considering the example we discussed above : 
 
(1a) That man’s legs are crossed [said or thought while looking at someone in the mirror] 
(1b) Oh, but that man is myself ! 
(1c) (So) my legs are crossed 
 
The conclusion (1c) is a first person judgment that is subject to misidentification errors, 
because it rests upon an identity, namely (1b). There is no doubt that, in (1c), the subject 
explicitly identifies himself as the person whose legs are crossed. The form of the reasoning is 
as follows : 
 
b is F  
a = b 
a is F 
 
But if a demonstrative judgment like (1a) has the categoric structure ‘b is F’, does it not 
follow that the explanation of IEM I have offered is wrong? After all, (1a) is just as immune 
to error through misidentification as ‘That man is running’ in the earlier example. By looking 
at a man, the subject gains the information that someone is F (running, or such that his legs 
are crossed), and that information cannot be separated from the singular information that the 
man in question (‘that man’) is F. So (1a) is immune to error through misidentification, yet its 
structure is the standard categoric structure ‘b is F’. It is not an implicit de re thought in which 
only the property of being F is represented, the object to which the property is ascribed being 
determined in some other way. 
 
3.2  Implicit de re thoughts 
 
What are we to think of these objections ? The second one should not carry much weight, for 
I have already conceded that a judgment may be explicitly about an object (hence of the ‘a is 
F’ type) while still being immune to error through misidentification of the object in question. 
In the revised version of the theory, the immunity of a judgment does not entail that its object 
(the object with respect to which there can be no error through misidentification) remains 
implicit. What needs to have thetic (rather than categoric) content is not the immune judgment 
itself, but the experience on which it is based (and the primary judgment that goes with it, 
whatever its exact status). So we may grant (1a) the categoric structure ‘a is F’, just as we 
treated explicit de se thoughts as having such structure. 
As for the first objection, we could also accept that, insofar as it rests on a contrast 
between the object that is judged to be F and other objects, a demonstrative judgment ‘That G 
is F’ is explicitly about the demonstrated object. Once again, that is compatible with the 
judgment’s being immune. Still, we can make sense of the idea that, underlying an explicit 
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demonstrative judgment like (1a), there is a more basic judgment that is implicitly de re, and 
whose content matches the content of the experience. 
The evidence in favour of implicit de re judgments comes from Pryor’s discussion of 
‘which object-misidentification’, a topic I alluded to at the beginning of this chapter. Pryor 
gives the following example. I smell a skunky odor in my garden and think ‘There is a skunk 
in my garden’. That, Pryor says, is an existential judgment : I do not think of any animal in 
particular that it is a skunk in my garden. If now a small animal suddenly appears in full sight, 
I will presumably think of it — that animal — that it is a skunk (in my garden). That may be a 
mistake, though : there may be a real skunk, hidden in the bushes, responsible for the smell, 
while the animal I see is a different species altogether. Here, Pryor says, misidentification 
occurs, yet no identity ‘a = b’ is involved, for the mistake does not consist in moving from ‘b 
is F’ to ‘a is F’ : rather, we move from a purely existential statement ‘Some x is F’ to a 
singular instance ‘a is F’. 
It may be argued, following Coliva (2006), that there is an identity premiss in the 
skunk case, though one that involves a definite description : ‘That animal = the thing 
responsible for the smell.’ Still, there is a problem : an identity assumption ‘a = b’ can only 
take us from ‘b is F’ to 'a is F’. It does not take us from ‘Some x is F’ to ‘b is F’ in the first 
place. Nor does the absence of any such assumption explain, without further background, why 
in some cases (as Pryor claims) the step from ‘Some x is F’ to ‘b is F’ is immune to the sort of 
error which the example illustrates. To address these worries, one might be tempted to flatly 
deny Pryor’s intuition that the judgment based on the smell experience is not about any 
particular object, but has existential force (‘There is a skunk in the garden’). The judgment, 
one might suggest, is de re, appearances notwithstanding : it is about the object one is 
smelling. The mistake consists in equating that object with the object one is seeing, and that is 
a standard case of de re misidentification. 
I think this diagnostic is right, to a large extent ; yet I also think Pryor’s intuition is 
essentially correct : the initial judgment (immediately based upon the smell experience) is not 
de re in the classical sense – it does not have the form ‘a is F’. Rather than putting it in 
existential form, as Pryor does, it would be more revealing perhaps to couch the content of the 
judgment in impersonal form : ‘It is skunky’, on the pattern of ‘It is raining’. Or, even better, 
we can think of it as simply the content of a predicate : ‘Skunk !’, on the pattern of implicit de 
se thoughts. In this case too, arguably, it is the experiential mode which determines that with 
respect to which the predicate is to be evaluated. 
In the case of a smell experience (in contrast to the case of proprioception), the 
properties that are detected on the olfactory mode are properties of the object or objects that 
one is smelling. Just as in the proprioception case, the experience, with its thetic content, can 
give rise to two judgments: one (the primary judgment) that has the same thetic content, and 
one that makes explicit the contribution of the mode. So, on the basis of your smell 
experience, you can judge 'Skunk!'/‘It is skunky’, or more explicitly: 'That [which I smell] is a 
skunk'. In the former case, no mistake can be made as to which object is a skunk since no 
object is identified: the content is simply the property of being a skunk, and the object this 
concerns is determined by the experiential mode, leaving the subject no choice. When we 
make explicit the contribution of the mode by entertaining a more complex content with 
categoric structure ('That [which I smell] is a skunk') immunity is retained: the 
epistemological situation does not change because no extra evidence is needed to make the 
more complex judgment. It is simply a matter of making explicit what was already implicit. 
Misidentification occurs only at a later stage, when we move from ‘That [which I smell] is a 
skunk’ to ‘That [which I see] is a skunk’ (using the identity ‘That [which I smell] = that 
[which I see]’). The pattern is by now familiar : 
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(A’’) Skunk !     (primary judgment, implicitly de re) 
(B’’) That [which I smell] is a skunk  (from A’’, by Reflection) 
(C’’) That [which I smell] = that [which I see] (additional premiss) 
(D’’) That [which I see] is a skunk   (from B’’ and C’’, through substitution 
of identicals) 
 
On the view we arrive at, demonstrative thoughts themselves come in two varieties : 
implicit and explicit. The element of discrimination and contrast which is arguably 
characteristic of demonstrative thoughts only affects the content of explicit demonstrative 
thoughts. Implicit demonstrative judgments do rely upon an act of selective attention, but the 
content of such thoughts is restricted to the properties that are detected through the attentional 
act. The object those properties are ascribed to is determined not via the content of the 
thought but via the experiential mode : the object is whatever has grabbed the subject’s 
attention. 
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have presented a revision, and a defence, of the approach to immunity 
sketched in my book Perspectival Thought. The content of an experiential state is 
distinguished from its mode, and the mode is seen as contributing (or constraining) the 
situation with respect to which the content of the state is to be evaluated. Semantically, this 
gives us two levels of content (broadly speaking) for an experiential state and the primary 
judgment it gives rise to: the content in the narrow sense, or lekton, and the ‘Austinian 
proposition’ consisting of that content together with the relevant situation of evaluation. 
Whatever is part of the situation of evaluation as determined by the mode is fixed 
independently of the content of the judgment, and cannot be misrepresented since it is not 
represented at all. Immunity to error through misidentification follows. 
 The main revision to the original view is this. I acknowledge that immunity is not an 
exclusive property of those ascriptions that are implicitly conveyed by the judgments whose 
explicit content is ‘thetic’ : a judgment may be immune to error through misidentification of 
its object even if the latter is explicitly represented, provided the explicit representation results 
from ‘Reflection’. Reflection makes the objects of thought explicit by deploying indexical 
concepts which refer to them through relations to these objects which are already implied by 
the mode of the grounding experience. 
 In the last part of the paper I have tackled the issue of immunity as applied to 
demonstrative judgments. Just as first person judgments, I argued, demonstrative judgments 
can be either explicit or implicit. An explicit demonstrative judgment deploys a demonstrative 
concept based upon the relation of attending to the referent ; an implicit demonstrative 
judgment is based upon the same relation but represents only the observed features of the 
object attended to, not the object itself (indexically or otherwise). Again, immunity to error 
through misidentification follows from the unarticulated nature of the object in the implicit 
case, and is preserved when the object is made indexically explicit through Reflection.
*
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